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Sanhedrin (סנהדרין)

The tractate Sanhedrin deals with the Jewish judicial system, courts of justice, legal procedures, and capital punishment according to Jewish law.

Nezikin11 chapters
Composizione delle corti (tre, ventitré, settantuno) (Mishnah 1:1–6)
V.
Hebrew
Orthodox reading
1:1
דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת, בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה. גְּזֵלוֹת וַחֲבָלוֹת, בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה. נֶזֶק וַחֲצִי נֶזֶק, תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל וְתַשְׁלוּמֵי אַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִשָּׁה, בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה. הָאוֹנֵס וְהַמְפַתֶּה וְהַמּוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע, בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים, מוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע, בְּעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁיֶּשׁ בּוֹ דִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת:
ⓘ are judged by three. Robberies and bodily injuries, by three. Full damages and half-damages, ⓘ and restitution of fourfold and fivefold, by three. The violator, the seducer, and the defamer, by three — the words of Rabbi Meir. And the Sages state: the defamer is judged by twenty-three, because there are in it ⓘ.
1:2
מַכּוֹת, בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה. מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אָמְרוּ, בְּעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה. עִבּוּר הַחֹדֶשׁ, בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה. עִבּוּר הַשָּׁנָה, בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר, בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה מַתְחִילִין, וּבַחֲמִשָּׁה נוֹשְׂאִין וְנוֹתְנִין, וְגוֹמְרִין בְּשִׁבְעָה. וְאִם גָּמְרוּ בִשְׁלֹשָׁה, מְעֻבֶּרֶת:
ⓘ: with three (judges). In the name of Rabbi Ishmael they state: with twenty-three. The intercalation of the month: with three. The ⓘ: with three — the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel II states: with three one begins, with five one deliberates, and one concludes with seven. And if they concluded with three, (the year) is intercalated.
1:3
סְמִיכַת זְקֵנִים וַעֲרִיפַת עֶגְלָה, בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן. וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר, בַּחֲמִשָּׁה. הַחֲלִיצָה וְהַמֵּאוּנִין, בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה. נֶטַע רְבָעִי וּמַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי שֶׁאֵין דָּמָיו יְדוּעִין, בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה. הַהֶקְדֵּשׁוֹת, בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה. הָעֲרָכִין הַמִּטַּלְטְלִין, בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר, אֶחָד מֵהֶן כֹּהֵן. וְהַקַּרְקָעוֹת, תִּשְׁעָה וְכֹהֵן. וְאָדָם, כַּיּוֹצֵא בָהֶן:
ⓘ and ⓘ (are performed) before three (judges): the word of Rabbi Shimon. And Rabbi Yehudah states: five. ⓘ and the repudiation of the minor (are performed) before three (judges). The fruit of the fourth year and the second tithe whose value is unknown (are assessed) before three (judges). ⓘ (is assessed) before three (judges). The ⓘ of movable goods (are deliberated) before three (judges); Rabbi Yehudah states: one of them must be a priest. And immovable property (is deliberated before) nine and a priest. And (the valuation of) a person, as these.
1:4
דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת, בְּעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה. הָרוֹבֵעַ וְהַנִּרְבָּע, בְּעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה, שֶׁנֶאֱמַר (ויקרא כ) וְהָרַגְתָּ אֶת הָאִשָּׁה וְאֶת הַבְּהֵמָה, וְאוֹמֵר (שם) וְאֶת הַבְּהֵמָה תַּהֲרֹגוּ. שׁוֹר הַנִּסְקָל, בְּעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שמות כא) הַשּׁוֹר יִסָּקֵל וְגַם בְּעָלָיו יוּמָת, כְּמִיתַת בְּעָלִים כָּךְ מִיתַת הַשּׁוֹר. הַזְּאֵב וְהָאֲרִי, הַדֹּב וְהַנָּמֵר וְהַבַּרְדְּלָס וְהַנָּחָשׁ, מִיתָתָן בְּעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר, כָּל הַקּוֹדֵם לְהָרְגָן, זָכָה. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר, מִיתָתָן בְּעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה:
ⓘ [are judged] by twenty-three [judges]. One who has intercourse with an animal, and the animal (with which intercourse was had), [are judged] by twenty-three, as it is said (Leviticus 20): "You shall kill the woman and the animal," and it is written (ibid.): "and the animal you shall kill." The ox to be stoned [is judged] by twenty-three, as it is said (Exodus 21): "The ox shall be stoned and also its owner shall be put to death" — as the death of the owner, so the putting to death of the ox. The wolf and the lion, the bear and the leopard, the ⓘ and the serpent — their putting to death [is decided] by twenty-three [judges]. Rabbi Eliezer states: whoever kills them first has acquired merit. Rabbi Akiva states: their putting to death [is decided] by twenty-three [judges].
1:5
אֵין דָּנִין לֹא אֶת הַשֵּׁבֶט וְלֹא אֶת נְבִיא הַשֶּׁקֶר וְלֹא אֶת כֹּהֵן גָּדוֹל, אֶלָּא עַל פִּי בֵית דִּין שֶׁל שִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד. וְאֵין מוֹצִיאִין לְמִלְחֶמֶת הָרְשׁוּת, אֶלָּא עַל פִּי בֵית דִּין שֶׁל שִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד. אֵין מוֹסִיפִין עַל הָעִיר וְעַל הָעֲזָרוֹת, אֶלָּא עַל פִּי בֵית דִּין שֶׁל שִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד. אֵין עוֹשִׂין סַנְהֶדְרִיּוֹת לַשְּׁבָטִים, אֶלָּא עַל פִּי בֵית דִּין שֶׁל שִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד. אֵין עוֹשִׂין עִיר הַנִּדַּחַת, אֶלָּא עַל פִּי בֵית דִּין שֶׁל שִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד. וְאֵין עוֹשִׂין עִיר הַנִּדַּחַת בַּסְּפָר, וְלֹא שְׁלֹשָׁה, אֲבָל עוֹשִׂין אַחַת אוֹ שְׁתָּיִם:
One is not judged — neither the tribe, nor the false prophet, nor the high priest — except by decision of the Sanhedrin of seventy-one. One does not undertake a ⓘ, except by decision of the Sanhedrin of seventy-one. One does not expand the city (of Jerusalem) nor the ⓘ, except by decision of the Sanhedrin of seventy-one. One does not establish tribal Sanhedrins, except by decision of the Sanhedrin of seventy-one. One does not declare a ⓘ, except by decision of the Sanhedrin of seventy-one. And one does not declare a subverted city on the frontier, nor does one declare three; but one or two may be declared.
1:6
סַנְהֶדְרִי גְדוֹלָה הָיְתָה שֶׁל שִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד, וּקְטַנָּה שֶׁל עֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה. וּמִנַּיִן לַגְּדוֹלָה שֶׁהִיא שֶׁל שִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (במדבר יא) אֶסְפָה לִּי שִׁבְעִים אִישׁ מִזִּקְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, וּמֹשֶׁה עַל גַּבֵּיהֶן, הֲרֵי שִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר, שִׁבְעִים. וּמִנַּיִן לַקְּטַנָּה שֶׁהִיא שֶׁל עֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שם לה) וְשָׁפְטוּ הָעֵדָה וְגוֹ' וְהִצִּילוּ הָעֵדָה, עֵדָה שׁוֹפֶטֶת וְעֵדָה מַצֶּלֶת, הֲרֵי כָאן עֶשְׂרִים. וּמִנַּיִן לָעֵדָה שֶׁהִיא עֲשָׂרָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שם יד) עַד מָתַי לָעֵדָה הָרָעָה הַזֹּאת, יָצְאוּ יְהוֹשֻׁעַ וְכָלֵב. וּמִנַּיִן לְהָבִיא עוֹד שְׁלֹשָׁה, מִמַּשְׁמַע שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שמות כג) לֹא תִהְיֶה אַחֲרֵי רַבִּים לְרָעֹת, שׁוֹמֵעַ אֲנִי שֶׁאֶהְיֶה עִמָּהֶם לְטוֹבָה, אִם כֵּן לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר (שם) אַחֲרֵי רַבִּים לְהַטֹּת, לֹא כְהַטָּיָתְךָ לְטוֹבָה הַטָּיָתְךָ לְרָעָה. הַטָּיָתְךָ לְטוֹבָה עַל פִּי אֶחָד, הַטָּיָתְךָ לְרָעָה עַל פִּי שְׁנַיִם, וְאֵין בֵּית דִּין שָׁקוּל, מוֹסִיפִין עֲלֵיהֶם עוֹד אֶחָד, הֲרֵי כָאן עֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה. וְכַמָּה יְהֵא בְעִיר וּתְהֵא רְאוּיָה לְסַנְהֶדְרִין, מֵאָה וְעֶשְׂרִים. רַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה אוֹמֵר, מָאתַיִם וּשְׁלשִׁים, כְּנֶגֶד שָׂרֵי עֲשָׂרוֹת:
The Great Sanhedrin consisted of seventy-one, and the small one of twenty-three. From where (is it derived) that the great one consists of seventy-one? As it is said (Nm 11:16): "Gather for me seventy men from the elders of Israel" — and Moses (was) above them: behold seventy-one. Rabbi Yehudah states: seventy. From where (is it derived) that the small one consists of twenty-three? As it is said (Nm 35:24–25): "The assembly shall judge... and the assembly shall save" — one ⓘ judges and one assembly saves: behold twenty. From where (is it derived) that an assembly consists of ten? As it is said (Nm 14:27): "How long, this wicked assembly" — Joshua and Caleb had departed from it. From where (is it derived) to add three more? From the implication of what is said (Ex 23:2): "Do not follow the majority for evil" — from this I infer that one (must) follow it for good; if so, why is it said (ibid.): "Following the majority to incline the judgment"? Because your inclination toward acquittal is not like your inclination toward conviction: the inclination toward acquittal (operates) by one; the inclination toward conviction by two. And since the court cannot be evenly divided, one more is added to them: behold twenty-three. And how many (inhabitants) must a city have in order to be fit to have a Sanhedrin? One hundred and twenty. Rabbi Nehemiah states: two hundred and thirty, corresponding to the ⓘ.
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Historical-halakhic study

Historical-halakhic context

The pericope opening the tractate Sanhedrin constitutes the architectural foundation of the entire tannaitic judicial system. This is not a mere procedural classification but rather Israel's self-understanding as a community governed by the Torah through legitimate institutions. The cardinal distinction between dinei mamonot (civil-property cases) and dinei nefashot (capital cases) is not technical but theological: it reflects the gradation of responsibility that the Torah assigns to those judging matters of property as opposed to those deliberating on human life.

The material belongs to the juridical elaboration of the post-70 CE period, when the historical Sanhedrin of the Temple had ceased to exist as a functioning institution. The tannaim named here — Rabbi Meir, Rabbi Yehudah bar Ilai, Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai (fourth generation), Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Akiva (third generation), Rabbi Eliezer ben Horkanos (second generation), Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel II (Nasi of the fourth generation), and Rabbi Nehemia — operated in the academies of Yavneh and Usha. The Mishnah preserves and reconstructs in normative form the ideal structure of the courts (beit din) to ensure halakhic continuity: the Sanhedrin of seventy-one becomes institutional memory projected as a permanent normative model.

The socio-political context is that of the reorganization of rabbinic authority after the destruction. The disputes between Rabbi Meir and the Sages (mishnah 1), or between Rabbi Meir and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel II on intercalation (mishnah 2), testify to the deliberative process through which the halakhah is established: not authoritarian imposition, but dialogue among legitimate positions.

Internal halakhic dialogue

The Babylonian Talmud (b.Sanhedrin 2a-17b) devotes extensive treatment to the six mishnayot, expanding each norm with scriptural arguments and amoraic disputes. The fundamental dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages on the case of the motzi shem ra (defamer of the bride) is analyzed in b.Sanhedrin 8b: the Sages require twenty-three judges because the potential penalty for the slandered woman — stoning — renders the proceeding a capital case. The gemara elaborates the principle that the composition of the court follows the most severe potential consequence.

The position of Rabbi Ishmael on flogging (makkot), which requires twenty-three judges rather than three, is discussed in b.Sanhedrin 10a and connected to the risk that an error in medical evaluation might cause the death of the condemned. The Jerusalem Talmud (j.Sanhedrin 1:1, 18a) adds a perspective on the dignity of the condemned.

For the intercalation of the year, b.Sanhedrin 10b-11a develops the procedure of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel II (three initiate, five deliberate, seven conclude) as a progression of increasing authority. The Tosefta Sanhedrin 2:1-2 provides details on the qualifications required for members of the calendrical court.

The derivation of the numbers seventy-one and twenty-three (mishnah 6) receives extensive elaboration in b.Sanhedrin 17a, where the halakhic midrash on Numbers 11:16 (the seventy elders plus Moses) and Numbers 35:24-25 (the edah that judges and the edah that saves) is reinforced with the principle from Exodus 23:2: condemnation requires a majority of two votes, acquittal only one, and the court cannot be evenly divided.

Roots in the New Testament

The structure of the beit din of three judges finds a documented parallel in the disciplinary procedure outlined in Matthew 18:15-17: "If your brother sins, go and reprove him between you and him alone; if he listens to you, you have gained your brother. But if he does not listen to you, take with you one or two more, so that every word may be confirmed by the mouth of two or three witnesses. If he refuses to listen to them, tell it to the ekklesia." The progression — private confrontation, two or three witnesses, assembly — mirrors the tannaitic logic of graduated correction and of din Torah as a communal procedure, not punitive but oriented toward the recovery of the brother.

The Greek term parelambano (to receive by transmission) in 1 Corinthians 11:23 and 15:3 corresponds to the concept of qibbel (to receive tradition), attesting the continuity of the transmissive chain that the Mishnah Avot 1:1 places at the foundation of rabbinic authority. Paul employs the same epistemic structure: what is taught is what has been received from an authoritative chain.

The concept of shaliach (one sent with the full authority of the sender) informs the christology of sending in John 20:21: "As the Father has sent me, I also send you." The one sent is as the one who sent him — a halakhic principle that the New Testament applies to the apostolic mission without abrogating its Jewish juridical matrix.

Practical observance

The norm establishes who may judge and how many must be present for a judgment to be valid. One who observes this halakhah does not sit in judgment alone on civil-property matters but forms a court of at least three; does not deliberate on capital cases except in a panel of twenty-three; recognizes that certain decisions — judging a tribe, a false prophet, the high priest, declaring optional war, extending the sacred boundaries — belong exclusively to the Sanhedrin of seventy-one.

The practical dimension extends to the formation of communities: a city requires one hundred twenty inhabitants (or two hundred thirty according to Rabbi Nehemia) to establish a local Sanhedrin. This ensures that justice is not centralized but distributed, and that every sufficiently populous community has access to a competent court.

In the New Testament, the Fraternal Correction (Matthew 18:15-17; Galatians 6:1) reprises this structure: private confrontation precedes the involvement of witnesses, which precedes recourse to the assembly. The category Unity and Peace (Romans 12:18; Ephesians 4:3) finds here its procedural foundation: communal peace is preserved through legitimate judicial institutions that resolve disputes according to Torah, not through private vengeance or anarchy. The category Righteousness and Justice (Micah 6:8 reprised in Matthew 23:23) demands that judgment be exercised with the prescribed number of judges, a guarantee against arbitrariness and a safeguard for the dignity of every party.